Michigan Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 2

1961

Taxation - Federal Income Tax - Capital Gain Treatment of Amount
Received from Sublessee by Lessee-Sublessor for Surrender of
Lease to Lessor
Paul Tractenberg
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul Tractenberg, Taxation - Federal Income Tax - Capital Gain Treatment of Amount Received from
Sublessee by Lessee-Sublessor for Surrender of Lease to Lessor, 60 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/12

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1961]

RECENT DECISIONS

235

TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT OF
AMOUNT RECEIVED FROM SUBLESSEE BY LESSEE-SUBLESSOR FOR SURRENDER OF
LEASE To LESSOR-The lessor and the sublessee of a valuable piece of business property sought to remove the intervening interest of petitioner, the
lessee-sublessor. Petitioner agreed to release to the lessor all his right and
interest in the leasehold and in consideration therefor petitioner received
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a sum of money from the sublessee. The Tax Court1 decided in a
deficiency proceeding that the entire amount should be taxed as ordinary
income on the ground that it was merely a substitute for future rental
payments. On appeal, held, reversed. Since the substance of the transaction
was the transfer of the leasehold from the lessee to the lessor there was
a sale of a capital asset and the sum was taxable as capital gain under the
predecessor of section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
Subchapter P of the 1954 Code3 generally defines and delimits the
area in which capital gains treatment will be applied. To be entitled
to such preferential treatment4 two requirements must be met: the object
of a given transaction must fall within the Code definition of a "capital
asset"; 5 and, there must be a "sale or exchange" of the object. The
capital-asset requirement has been considered by some authorities as
the most important control point in screening the increasing flood of
attempts to secure the preferential tax treatment accorded capital gains. 6
However, in the area of leaseholds and analogous interests in real property it seems settled that these interests generally qualify as "capital assets." 1
The major interpretative problem in leasehold cases is whether a
transaction constitutes a "sale or exchange." Two aspects of this problem
require consideration in connection with the principal case. The first
is whether the "sale or exchange" prerequisite to capital gains treatment
can be satisfied by either party to a transaction involving the transfer of
a leasehold interest. In 1941 the Supreme Court held that a lessor had
not met the capital gains requirements when he received payment in
consideration for the release of his lessee from all obligations under the
lease.8 The Court reasoned that since the lessor had not given up any
Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971 (1959).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (j), added by ch. 619, § 151, 56 Stat. 846 (1942).
The equivalent area was covered by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117, ch. 2, 53 Stat.
50, as amended.
4 "The capital gains provisions in the income tax law are remedial provisions and
were intended by Congress to alleviate the burden on a taxpayer where the property
has increased in value over a long period of time, for having profits from sales taxed
at graduated tax rates designed for a single year's income ••••" Martin v. United States,
119 F. Supp. 468, 473 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
5 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222, 1231.
o 3B MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 22.11 at 56 (rev. ed. 1958); see,
e.g., Mansfield Journal Co. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1960); Bidart
Bros. v. United States, 262 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959).
But see Commissioner v. Pittston, 252 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958).
'1 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829
(1954) ; Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
939 (1953). See generally 6 VAND. L. REv. 933 (1953).
8 Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
1
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interest in the property the payment could not be connected with a
"sale or exchange" but was a substitute for future rent. Two years later,
the Board of Tax Appeals settled the question as to the lessee by deciding
there had been a "sale" when he transferred all his interest in the property
to a third party in return for a sum of money.9 Since the lessee is capable
of achieving capital-gain status under certain circumstances the second
part of the problem is whether he can realize capital gain if he gives up
his interest to the lessor. Using the analogous authority of three leading
cases10 which had held that the relinquishment of life interests in trusts
to the remaindermen were "sales," the Third Circuit ruled a lumpsum payment received by the lessee from his lessor for cancellation of
the lease was the product of a "sale" and therefore a capital gain.11
Subsequently, this holding was codified by Congress,12 thereby resolving
all doubts concerning the second aspect of the "sale or exchange" problem. Congress, however, specifically negated any implication that the
codification was to affect the situation in which the lessor received the
payment.13 The primary point of contention in the principal case was
whether the petitioner, the lessee-sublessor, had received the payment in
his capacity as lessee or lessor. The key to this determination seems to be
whether he gave up his interest in the property in consideration of the
payment. If he did, he would be receiving it as a lessee. The Tax Court
indicated the release of the right to future rental income was the primary
purpose of the transaction; the transfer of the underlying leasehold was
deemed merely incidental. The court acknowledged that if petitioner had
been able to prove that a part of the sum had been received for the
transfer of the leasehold, that part of the consideration could have been
treated as capital gain. Since he had failed to establish such an apportionment to the satisfaction of the court, the entire payment was
considered to be for the cancellation of the sublease which did not
involve petitioner's relinquishment of his interest in the property, anq
the sum was treated as ordinary income. The court of appeals, on the
other hand, concluded that since the lessor and sublessee wished to remove
petitioner's intervening interest so they could enter into a mutually
profitable long-term arrangement, petitioner was in a position of
practical advantage and the "lease clearly had value over the amount of
o Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942) •
10 Allen v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946) , cert. denied,
330 U.S. 828 (1947); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
11 Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939
(1953).
12 INT, R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1241.
13 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 444 (1954) •
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rentals due ..." 14 under the sublease. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the transfer covered the entire leasehold and the payment to petitioner
was received by him in his capacity as a surrendering lessee. The fact
that the payor was the party who was being relieved of the obligation to
pay rent was not a sufficiently important factor to convince the court
that the amount paid was merely a substitute for rent. Once it is
determined that the petitioner has received payment in his capacity as
a lessee, the statutory provision becomes applicable and the payment is
treated as the product of a "sale" and is a capital gain.
It appears that the view taken by the court of appeals was more
realistic than that of the Tax Court. The mere cancellation of the
sublease and the accompanying liquidation of the right to future
income was not the essence of the agreement. Obviously, the parties'
purpose would have been frustrated had there been no transfer of the
underlying leasehold. No matter how it was measured and who was paying
it, the sum given to petitioner was in consideration of the disposition
of his entire interest in the income-producing property. 15
However, it might be argued that in the principal case there were two
transactions-a payment in lieu of rent, and a "sale" of the leasehold.
Arguably, that part of the total amount which was a substitute for future
rent due under the sublease could be ordinary income, and only the
excess capital gain. The proof problems implicit in this approach may be
troublesome, but they seem surmountable. The total amount of rent
due is clearly calculable since the length of the sublease and the amounts
of all future payments were fixed. This figure could be adjusted to take
into account the accelerated method of payment and the balance would
represent the amount to be treated as capital gain. As the Tax Court
mentioned in dictum, this appears to be a legitimate approach and it
would serve to limit the application of preferential tax treatment to that
sum which represents the "sale" price of the capital asset. Militating
against this approach, however, is the recent decision of the Third Circuit
which provided that "for tax purposes such anticipated earnings . . •
are treated as merely enhancing the value of the income producing
property and, therefore, are not differentiated from the capital gain
realized in the sale of the underlying capital asset." 16 In view of the
fairly general acceptance of this view17 and of the judicial trend to expand
the application of the capital gains provisions, the court's conclusion in
the principal case, at least as a technical matter, seems to be the more
Principal case at 594.
Ibid.
16 Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658, 661 n.2 (3d Cir. 1961).
17 See Levy, The Line Between a Sale of Property and the Anticipation of Ordinary
Income, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX 399 (1949).
14
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sound. Whether this result accords with the best public policy is a
question better suited, at this advanced stage in the judicial treatment
of the area, to legislative consideration.18
Paul Tractenberg

18 See generally 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
REVISION COMPENDIUM 1193-1301 (1959).
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